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On 6 April, the Trump administration introduced additional, more severe sanctions against 
Russia, covering 24 people and 14 companies: Russian oligarchs, the businesses they run, sen-
ior government officials and heads of state corporations, and (again) the Russian state arms 
company Rosoboroneksport. The immediate consequence of the new sanctions has been 
a downturn on the Russian stock market and the weakening of the rouble, as well as financial 
problems for the companies sanctioned, especially those belonging to the oligarch Oleg Deri-
paska. In the longer term the Russian oligarchs and their companies which conduct extensive 
activity abroad will find that the sanctions hamper their operations, and as a result, their 
dependence on the Kremlin will increase. On the other hand, the Kremlin will have increasing 
difficulty in recouping the affected oligarchs’ losses, which will lead to an increase in ten-
sions within the elite, as well as a rise in social discontent, which will make the functioning of 
Putin’s regime more costly.
The US sanctions represent the next stage of the crisis in Russian-American relations. They 
were imposed just after the expulsion from Russia of 60 American diplomats in retaliation 
for a similar decision by the US regarding Russian diplomats. The crisis may deepen further as 
a result of the military response which the US has announced in response to a chemical attack 
in Duma, Syria on 7 April, most likely by the Assad regime’s forces. An escalation of the crisis 
does not suit the Kremlin, which still seems to nurture hope that the recently announced fur-
ther Putin-Trump meeting could initiate the process of normalisation of Russian-American re-
lations. On the other hand, for reasons concerning its image, the Kremlin will probably under-
take some kind of limited retaliation against the US, in order to demonstrate to Washington 
its potential to cause harm. All this means a long-lasting crisis in Russian-American relations. 
The new US sanctions
The expansion of the designation list of sanc-
tions against Russia, introduced on 6 April by 
a decision of the US Treasury Department, has 
been justified by the hostile (from the point of 
view of the US’s interests) activities Moscow has 
undertaken in recent years and which are still 
continuing: attempts at hostile interference in 
the internal affairs of Western countries (includ-
ing the US), the aggression against Ukraine and 
the occupation of Crimea, and its support for 
the Assad regime in Syria. Four categories of 
Russian entities have been included:
 
1. Seven people from a larger group of Russian 
oligarchs belonging to the Russian elite, includ-
ing Oleg Deripaska, Suleiman Kerimov and Kirill 
Shamalov (the President’s former son-in-law; 
for more, see the Appendix). These individuals 
have benefited from profitable public procure-
ment contracts, and have sometimes received 
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state support for their foreign economic activi-
ty; in return they have funded political and eco-
nomic projects on behalf of the Kremlin, as well 
as the luxurious lifestyle of some members of 
the ruling elite’s inner circle.
2. Twelve companies whose principal owners 
are the individuals mentioned above; seven of 
these companies are controlled by Oleg Deri-
paska (see Appendix). These entities general-
ly conduct a wide range of foreign activities, 
including on the US market.
3. Seventeen Russian high officials and heads 
of public companies, including Viktor Zolotov 
(Commander of the National Guard), Nikolai 
Patrushev (Secretary of the Security Council) and 
Aleksei Miller (head of Gazprom) (see Appendix). 
These individuals belong to the ruling elite, 
and/or are suspected of personal involvement 
in lobbying and implementing Russia’s aggres-
sive actions.
4. Others have been included on the sanctions 
list for their support of the regime in Syria: once 
again, the Russian state arms company Rosobo-
roneksport (which was placed under sanctions 
in 2014 for its role in the aggression against 
Ukraine) and the Russian Financial Corporation 
Bank (RFK) which provides its services to it.
The sanctions against the physical persons in-
clude a ban on their entry onto the territory of 
the US, the freezing of their assets in US finan-
cial institutions, and a ban on transactions with 
US entities. The sanctions against legal persons 
also include freezing their assets on the terri-
tory of the US, a ban on transactions with US 
entities, and an order to dispose of any shares 
in these companies. By the decision of the US 
authorities, the sanctions can also be extended 
to cover companies from other countries which 
fail to dispose of their significant shares and/
or continue to conduct significant transactions 
with those firms affected by the sanctions, 
which poses a risk to some European compa-
nies, among others.
The sanctions have been severely criticised by 
the Russian authorities. While Premier Dmitry 
Medvedev has warned that Russia “reserves the 
right” to take retaliation, a spokesman for Pres-
ident Dmitri Peskov responded more temper-
ately when asked about the Russian response, 
and stressed that Russia would be guided by its 
own interests; this could suggest that the Rus-
sian response will be limited.
The consequences of the sanctions 
for Russia
The new US sanctions have both economic as 
well as political consequences for Russia both 
in the short and the long term. 
With regard to the short-term economic conse-
quences, the most seriously affected are the Rus-
sian oligarchs affected by sanctions, as well as 
other members of the richest Russians. Accord-
ing to calculations by Forbes, as a result of the 
fall in the value of the stock in their companies 
on 9 April alone, Deripaska lost US$1.3 billion, 
Viktor Vekselberg more than US$900 million, 
and Suleiman Kerimov more than US$800 mil-
lion. In total the 50 richest Russians (including 
both those covered by US sanctions and those 
not) lost a total of US$12 billion on that day.
The Russian stock market has been seriously af-
fected, losing between 9% and 11% of its main 
indices on 9 April. Many Russian companies 
saw significant declines in their share prices, 
both on the stock markets in Moscow (as ex-
amples: Rusal lost around 46%, Mechel around 
30%, Norilsky Nikel around 17%, Polyus around 
13%, the VTB bank 11%) and London. Earlier in 
Hong Kong, shares in Rusal fell by around 50%. 
In the longer term the Russian oligarchs 
and their companies which conduct exten-
sive activity abroad will find that the sanc-
tions hamper their operations, and as a re-
sult, their dependence on the Kremlin will 
increase.
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There was also a sudden weakening of the Rus-
sian rouble, which by the morning of 11 April 
had lost around 15% of its value against the US 
dollar and the euro.
Further economic consequences will depend on 
both how the Russian authorities respond to 
the sanctions and on the subsequent moves by 
Washington, as well as the reactions of Russia’s 
other important economic partners (the EU, Chi-
na). Above all Moscow fears the indirect effects 
of sanctions: deterring foreign entities (mainly, 
but not only, from the West) from any cooper-
ation with major Russian companies (primarily, 
but not only, those already covered by the sanc-
tions) for fear of negative reactions from the 
United States. Representatives of the Russian 
government (Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, 
Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich, the 
minister of industry and trade Denis Manturov) 
declared the government’s (undefined) support 
for the companies affected. The Russian gov-
ernment is also meeting in session to discuss 
the matter. From leaks emerging in the Russian 
media, it appears that various forms of assis-
tance are being considered: 
First, big state corporations may partially pur-
chase shares in the private companies affected. 
This would fit in with the government’s exist-
ing policy of increasing the state’s participation 
and control in the economy, and also with the 
ambitions of the individual heads of the state-
owned corporations (in particular Rosneft’s 
president Igor Sechin, who has been trying to 
consolidate the country’s energy assets). How-
ever, the problem lies in acquiring the funds 
for such transactions, which could potentially 
prove very expensive. This is particularly true 
for the heavily indebted state-owned compa-
nies; in one way or another they would need 
support from the State Treasury, which itself 
also has limited financial capabilities.
Second, tax breaks (as was previously arranged 
for companies hit by Western sanctions and 
belonged to President Putin’s friends, notably 
Gennady Timchenko, the Rotenberg brothers 
and Yuri Kovalchuk). However, this would be 
quite costly for the budget (which would re-
ceive less tax revenue); and the measure was 
previously applied to members of Putin’s inner 
circle, which most of those covered by the new 
sanctions are not part of.
Thirdly, the creation of tax havens on Russian 
territory, and the transfer to these places of 
the registered head offices of Russian global 
companies, which would somehow retain their 
previous legal form. According to reports in 
Vedomosti, the Russian government has accel-
erated the preparation of legal acts (which has 
already been underway for some months) to 
set up such special zones on Oktyabrsky island 
in the Kaliningrad oblast, and on Russky island 
near Vladivostok in the Primorsky krai. Entities 
belonging to Russian oligarchs and located in 
such places would be treated as foreign enti-
ties, and would pay taxes only on that part of 
their business which is carried out on Russian 
territory. This solution, although legally com-
plex and fairly time-consuming, would be quite 
beneficial for the Russian government, as it 
would substantially increase its control over the 
larger Russian private businesses and limit the 
financial costs of supporting them. However, it 
is doubtful whether this arrangement would be 
sufficiently attractive and secure from the point 
of view of any oligarchs who might be inter-
ested. It seems that they would only agree to 
such a plan if they had no other choice (if their 
companies were threatened with bankruptcy 
and the loss of the vast majority of their assets).
On the other hand, the Kremlin will have 
increasing difficulty in recouping the af-
fected oligarchs’ losses, which will lead to 
an increase in tensions within the elite, as 
well as a rise in social discontent, which 
will make the functioning of Putin’s regime 
more costly.
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The Russian authorities’ decision on the ques-
tion of possible forms of aid, and the attitude 
of the oligarchs towards them, could signifi-
cantly affect the political consequences of the 
current (and any possible future) sanctions. This 
could lead to the further evolution of the rela-
tionship between government and big business 
in Russia.
On the one hand, the current situation presents 
a major challenge for the Kremlin. In the stag-
nant Russian economy, which needs to finance 
both an intensive rearmament programme and 
increasing social security obligations, Russia is 
unable to bear the further burden of signifi-
cant, systematic financial aid for Russian private 
business. However, some form of support is es-
sential, for reasons of Russia’s public image – 
as a demonstration that the country is not 
bowing under the pressure of Western sanc-
tions, and is ready and able to resist them. 
The Kremlin also cannot afford to let the Russian 
oligarchs hit by sanctions fall into bankruptcy 
because it itself is sponging off them (the oli-
garchs fund the luxurious lifestyle of members 
of the ruling elite), and also uses their support 
in domestic politics (as they finance political 
and business projects) and as a tool of foreign 
policy (through the creation of foreign lobbies 
or by financing infrastructure investments).
In turn, granting the oligarchs even limited fi-
nancial support will inevitably increase the 
costs of maintaining the Putin system and gen-
erate additional tension, both within the elite 
and in society at large. Because the govern-
ment’s support will probably be selective, it will 
lead to competition among the oligarchs. This 
could also – despite the oligarchs’ resistance – 
result in part of their estates being taken over 
by state structures and other private entities 
closer to the Kremlin. Meanwhile, social ten-
sions will arise from the fact that in a situation 
of progressive pauperisation, the public will 
look upon the aid which the state grants to the 
privileged caste with increasing resentment.
On the other hand, the current situation pre-
sents an opportunity to the Kremlin. The Rus-
sian economy is suffering from a rising deficit 
of investment capital, for reasons including the 
Western sanctions. In this situation, the Kremlin 
is struggling to find ways to encourage or com-
pel those Russian oligarchs who have invested 
a significant part of their assets abroad to re-
patriate them and make investments in Russia. 
The sanctions restrict the Russian oligarchs’ ac-
cess to lucrative Western markets; and as they 
often have a raw-materials base in Russia, they 
cannot break their ties to the country. This in-
creases their dependence on the Russian gov-
ernment, which can dictate the conditions for 
doing business with them and offering possi-
ble state support. In this way – despite the bad 
investment climate prevalent in Russia – the 
Kremlin gains the opportunity to repatriate at 
least some of the capital, and thus keep the 
ailing Putin system afloat. However, the oper-
ation of this mechanism will depend on how 
far the United States goes in its sanctions poli-
cy, what the attitude of the European Union on 
this issue will be, as well as the reaction of Rus-
sia’s non-European partners (especially China 
and India).
Sanctions and crisis in Russian-American 
relations
The expansion of the US sanctions on 6 April 
is the most serious punitive action of this type 
taken by the US against Russia since July 2014 
(which saw the introduction of economic sanc-
The US government has struck at people 
and companies which conduct a broad 
range of economic activity abroad. This is 
part of a chain of events demonstrating the 
escalation of the crisis in Russian-Amer-
ican relations, something which does not 
suit the Kremlin.
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tions in response to Russia’s aggression against 
Ukraine). For the first time, the US authori-
ties have struck at the people and companies 
belonging to the Russian elite who conduct 
a broad range of economic activity abroad. 
At the same time, this is part of a chain of 
events demonstrating the escalation of the cri-
sis in Russian-American relations.
These latest sanctions were introduced the day 
after the forced departure from Russia of 60 US 
diplomats from the embassy in Moscow and 
the consulate in Yekaterinburg (and a week af-
ter the forced closure of the American consulate 
in St. Petersburg); this was Russia’s retaliation 
for the expulsion from the US on 26 March of 
the same number of Russian diplomats, and the 
closure of the Russian consulate in Seattle (de-
cisions taken after the Russian chemical attack 
in Britain on 4 March). This was the largest such 
‘exchange’ in the history of Russian-American 
relations. These moves have worsened what 
was already the poorest state of relations be-
tween the two countries since the mid-1980s.
On the one hand, these latest US actions seem 
to confirm the Russian assessment of the Trump 
administration’s policy as unpredictable and 
dictated by an American establishment which 
is hungry for retaliation against Russia (for its 
interference in the US presidential elections 
of 2016). Russia’s conviction, that both the 
ruling Republicans and the opposition Demo-
crats (through their accusations of an alleged 
conspiracy by Trump and his people with the 
Kremlin in the 2016 campaign) have pushed 
the US President to take further steps against 
Russia, has probably been exacerbated by the 
recent personnel changes in the US govern-
ment. The resignations of Secretary of State Rex 
Tillerson and national security adviser Gen. H. R. 
McMaster, who had been seen as fairly critical 
towards Russia but favouring a moderate foreign 
policy, and their replacement by the notoriously 
more radical (also on the issue of Russia) Mike 
Pompeo and John Bolton, may suggest a further 
sharpening of the US’s approach to Moscow.
On the other hand, this is happening at a quite 
unfavourable moment for Moscow, as the Rus-
sian side is working intensively to bring about 
another meeting between Presidents Putin and 
Trump, apparently still hoping that this could 
lead to some psychological, then political break-
through in bilateral relations. Some statements 
by the American President, suggesting his re-
spect for Putin and a willingness to cooperate 
with Russia in resolving regional problems (such 
as in North Korea, Syria or even Ukraine), seem 
to have fuelled the belief that a personal dia-
logue between Putin and Trump could get the 
latter to take some non-standard decisions, pos-
sibly starting a process of normalising relations.
However, this does not mean that Russia intends 
to cease its hostile activities towards the US; 
it will continue to demonstrate its potential to 
cause damage, trying in this way to induce Wash-
ington to hold a serious discussion about the de-
marcation of the two countries’ interests, espe-
cially as the dynamics of events rather suggests 
an escalation of the Russian-American crisis.
The Russian-American conflict may be further 
aggravated against the background of the con-
flict in Syria. On 7 April the Syrian opposition 
accused the Syrian army, which is besieging 
the suburbs of Damascus (the town of Duma), 
of using chemical weapons against the civilian 
population there, apparently resulting in the 
deaths of about 70 people, including children. 
On 8 April, President Trump for the first time 
publicly accused President Putin of personal 
Washington’s introduction of new and more 
severe sanctions, and possible American 
military action in Syria, will be seen by 
the Kremlin as a means of strengthening 
Trump’s position before his summit with 
Putin, and thus as a bargaining chip. We 
are dealing, then, with a test of strength be-
tween the United States and Russia.
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responsibility for the use of chemical weapons 
in Syria, and suggested that retaliatory meas-
ures could be taken. The next day, a ‘strong, 
unified response’ to the chemical attack by As-
sad’s forces was announced jointly by President 
Trump and France’s President Emmanuel Ma-
cron. On 11 April, Trump announced outright 
that there would be missile attacks on Syria. 
In Washington, preparations are underway for 
the military response, which according to me-
dia leaks may be coordinated with France, the 
United Kingdom and selected Arab countries, 
and could include air attacks on military targets 
in Syria as well as further sanctions.
When taking decisions about possible mili-
tary action in Syria, the US must consider how 
Russia will respond. On 13 March, the Chief of 
the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forc-
es, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, had already warned 
that in view of the fact that there are Russian 
military personnel in Syria, the Russian armed 
forces will respond to any American attack on 
the forces of President Assad, not only by strik-
ing at American missiles, but also at the ‘plat-
forms’ (i.e. the aircraft and ships) from which 
they will be fired. This increases the risk of di-
rect clashes between the armed forces of both 
states, although a Russian attack on American 
ships seem unlikely.
On the other hand, in connection with the 
intentions expressed by the Kremlin and the 
White House (including a statement by the US 
President’s spokeswoman on 6 April) to arrange 
a summit meeting between Trump and Putin, 
Washington’s introduction of new and more 
severe sanctions, and even possible American 
military action against Assad’s forces in Syria, 
will be seen by the Kremlin above all as a means 
of strengthening Trump’s position before the 
summit, and thus as a bargaining chip. We are 
dealing, then, with a test of strength between 
the United States and Russia. For the time be-
ing, the Russian side is not signalling any read-
iness to make real compromises on the most 
difficult questions (Ukraine, Syria, disarmament 
issues), which would be a condition for the US 
withdrawing its sanctions policy. On the oth-
er hand, Moscow’s hope of creating a ‘special 
relationship’ between Trump and Putin still 
appears to be holding the Kremlin back from 
trying to break the stalemate by undertaking 
any further radical escalation of the situation, 
especially in the military sphere. In this context, 
Russia’s more heated rhetoric (e.g. warning that 
a major military conflict is approaching, using 
the analogy of the Cuban missile crisis) seems 
to be being used as an instrument of psycho-
logical warfare before the talks expected at the 
summit. The situation points to a continued 
stalemate in Russian-American relations and 
the continuation of the current state of tension, 
interrupted by an exchange of diplomatic and 
economic ‘strikes’, albeit without any further 
radical escalations.
The text was finalised on 11 April at 1.30pm
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APPENDIX
Russian citizens and companies added to the US sanction lists on 6 April
1. People 
Name Position/principal assets Notes
Vladimir Bogdanov director-general of the oil 
company Surgutneftegas
49th on the list of Forbes’ richest Russians in 2017 
(US$1.9 billion); Surgutneftegas (covered by US 
sanctions) is the most opaque of the Russian oil 
companies, and it is suspected that President Putin 
holds shares in it
Oleg Deripaska main owner of the Rusal, 
En+, BazEl companies 
and others
23rd on the list of Forbes’ richest Russians in 2017 
(US$5.1 billion); suspected of links with organised 
crime
Suleiman Kerimov member of the Federation 
Council; main owner of the 
Polimetal, Polyus Gold, Ural-
kaliy companies and others 
22nd on the list of Forbes’ richest Russians in 2017 
(US$6.3 billion); accused in France of tax evasion
Igor Rotenberg head of the board of direc-
tors of NPV Engineering
son of Arkady Rotenberg, oligarch and friend of 
Putin; the father (who is on the sanctions list) has 
made part of his estate over to him. According to 
Forbes, his assets were worth US$700 million 
in 2017
Andrei Skoch deputy of the State Duma; 
co-owner of Vnukovo 
airport in Moscow and the 
Metaloinvest holding (Alish-
er Usmanov)
17th on the list of Forbes’ richest Russians in 2017 
(US$6.9 billion); suspected of links with organised 
crime and of having run the Solntsevo mafia 
in the past; friend and business partner of 
the oligarch Alisher Usmanov 
Kirill Shamalov co-owner of the Sibur gas 
and petrochemical company 
74th on the list of Forbes’ richest Russians in 2017 
(US$1.3 billion); probably President Putin’s former 
son-in-law (married his daughter Katerina Tikhono-
va in 2013; their alleged separation in January 
2018 may have been used to conceal part of his 
income); the son of Nikolai Shamalov, a friend 
of Putin’s and a shareholder in Bank Rossiya
Viktor Vekselberg owner of Renova 10th on the list of Forbes’ richest Russians in 2017 
(US$ 12.4 billion) 
Andrei Akimov head of the board 
of Gazprombank
In the 1980s and 1990s he worked at Russian 
banks and companies in Switzerland and Austria, 
while probably serving as a KGB/SVR officer; 
from 2004 to 2007, member of the senior manage-
ment of the Rusukrenergo company, an intermedi-
ary in trading Russian gas in Ukraine; member of 
the board of directors of the Novatek gas company. 
Member of Gazprom’s board of directors
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Aleksei Diumin governor of Tula oblast colonel-general; former FSB and FSO officer; former 
deputy head of GRU (military intelligence); former 
chief of staff of Russian Land Forces; former com-
mander of Special Operations Forces (participating 
in the annexation of Crimea); former deputy minis-
ter of defence; enjoys the confidence of President 
Putin and has been mentioned as a candidate 
for the highest position of state
Mikhail Fradkov director of the Russian 
Institute for Strategic Studies 
(RISI)
former Prime Minister of Russia; former head of 
the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)
Sergei Fursienko president of the Zenit 
St. Petersburg football club
an old friend of President Putin; in the 1990s par-
ticipated (with Putin) in the Ozero summer housing 
cooperative; former president of the Russian Foot-
ball Association
Oleg Govorun head of the board for 
socio-economic cooperation 
with the CIS countries, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
in the Russian President’s 
administration
former head of the internal policy board of the 
Russian President Administration; former repre-
sentative of the President in the Central Federal 
District; former minister for regional development; 
since 2013, one of the coordinators of Russian 
policy towards Ukraine; subordinate and friend 
to the President’s assistant Vladislav Surkov
Vladimir Kolokoltsev Minister of the Interior general of the police; former chief of police in Mos-
cow
Konstantin Kosachov the chairman of the Interna-
tional Committee for 
the Federation Council
former long-time Chairman of the International 
Affairs Committee of the State Duma; mentioned 
among the candidates to head the Foreign Ministry
Andrei Kostin the head of the board 
of directors of the state 
bank VTB (Vneshtorgbank)
enjoys the confidence of President Putin; former 
member of Rosneft’s board of directors. The VTB 
Bank is used to finance a variety of projects at the 
behest of the Kremlin. Another member of the 
board of the VTB is Matthias Warning (a former 
Stasi agent and friend of Putin)
Aleksei Miller the head of the board 
of directors of Gazprom
former friend and subordinate of Putin in the 
St. Petersburg mayor’s office (in the 1990s); head 
of the state-owned Gazprom company since 2001
Nikolai Patrushev Secretary of the Security 
Council of the Russian 
Federation
former officer of the KGB and FSB; long-time 
head of the FSB; since 2008, Secretary of 
the Security Council of the Russian Federation; 
enjoys the confidence of Putin
Vladislav Reznik deputy of the State Duma businessman (in the insurance sector) during the 
1990s; since 1999 a deputy of the State Duma; 
accused of links with organised crime 
(the Tambov mafia); fugitive in Spain from 
an international arrest warrant for mafia 
and money laundering activities
Yevgeny Shkolov assistant to the Russian 
President for human 
resources policy
former KGB officer; an old friend of Putin (served 
with him in the KGB in Dresden); former Deputy 
Minister of Internal Affairs; enjoys the confidence 
of Putin; oversees the Directorate for State Services 
and the Personnel of the President’s Administration
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Aleksandr Torshin vice-president of the Central 
Bank of Russia
long-time member of the Federation Council (rep-
resentative of the Mari-El Republic); accused 
in Spain of links to organized crime (the Tambov 
mafia); alleged boss of the Tambov mafia
Vladimir Ustinov representative of the Presi-
dent in the Southern Federal 
District
former Russian Attorney General (supervised the 
Yukos case, among others); former Minister of 
Justice; his son is married to the daughter of Igor 
Sechin, President of Rosneft
Timur Valyulin head of the Interior Minis-
try’s main board for coun-
ter-extremism
colonel in the militia; former head of the board 
for the fight against organised crime in Moscow
Viktor Zolotov director of the Federal 
Service of the National 
Guard Troops; Commander 
of the National Guard Troops
general of the army; an old  friend of Putin (1990s), 
previously linked to organised crime (Tambov ma-
fia, Malishev’s group); former long-time head of 
the Security Service of the President; former Deputy 
Minister of Internal Affairs, former Commander of 
Internal Troops; enjoys the confidence of Putin
Aleksandr Zharov head of Roskomnadzor 
(Federal Services for the 
Inspection of Communica-
tions, Information Technolo-
gy and Mass Media)
Roskomnadzor plays an important role in the re-
pressive activities of the state against independent 
media and limiting freedom of information 
on the Internet 
2. Russian companies  
Name main owner attention
Agroholding Kuban Oleg Deripaska subsidiary of the Bazovy Element holding compa-
ny; agri-food sector
Bazovy Element (BazEl) Oleg Deripaska diversified holding for companies in the energy, 
mining, metallurgical, construction, aviation 
& agricultural insurance sectors; global activities 
on six continents; owns 25% of shares in Austrian 
construction group Strabag, among others; owner 
of mines and aluminium smelters in Montenegro
B-Finance Oleg Deripaska financial company; the formal principal owner 
of En+
Gazprom Burenie Igor Rotenberg drilling company, until 2011 a subsidiary of Gaz-
prom, then completely taken over by Arkady 
Rotenberg; since 2014, owned by his son Igor
GAZ Group Oleg Deripaska automotive company, the group that controls 
a network of factories, cars and trucks, part 
of the holding company Russkie Mashiny; 
cooperates with Volkswagen, Daimler 
and General Motors companies
En+ Group Oleg Deripaska part of the Bazovy Element holding company, 
coordinates its energy and extractive divisions
EuroSibEnergo Oleg Deripaska electricity company which controls the hydro- 
-electric plant in Bratsk, part of the En+ group
Ladoga Management Kirill Shamalov financial company engaged in managerial services 
in the petrochemical sector
NPV Engineering Igor Rotenberg financial company, manages the assets of Gazprom 
Burenie, Mosenergo, Mostotrest among others
10OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 264
EDITORS: Adam Eberhardt, Anna Łabuszewska 
TRANSLATION: Jim Todd
DTP: Wojciech Mańkowski
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not 
necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities
Centre for Eastern Studies
Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw
phone: +48 | 22 | 525 80 00
e-mail: info@osw.waw.pl
Visit our website: www.osw.waw.pl
Renova Group Viktor Vekselberg diversified holding, controlling companies in the 
extractive sector (mainly aluminium), petroleum, 
telecommunications in Russia and the former 
USSR, Switzerland, South Africa and the US
RUSAL Oleg Deripaska aluminium company which controls a network 
of mines and aluminium works, belonging to 
the En+ group; the head of the board of directors 
is a friend of Putin’s, the former Stasi agent 
Matthias Warning
Russian Machines Oleg Deripaska holding in the automotive sector (production 
of cars and wagons), part of the Bazovy Element 
holding company
Rosoboronexport Rostec holds the state monopoly on arms trade with for-
eign countries; part of state corporation/ holding 
Rostec, headed by an old  friend of Putin, Sergei 
Chemezov
Russian Financial 
Corporation (RFC-Bank)  
in 2013 the bank was taken over by Sergei Cheme-
zov’s Rostec holding; from 1993 to 2013, President 
of the Bank was the economist Andrei Nechayev, 
who since 2013 has headed the moderate opposi-
tional party Citizens’ Initiative, which stood Ksenia 
Sobchak as its candidate in the presidential elec-
tions in 2018 (she later took control 
of the party)
